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ABSTRACT 
Japan was the first country to implement a ground-breaking reform in the railway sector in 
1987 when it broke up the Japanese National Railways (JNR) into six vertically integrated 
railway companies. Mainly because of the recent population decrease in local areas, many 
local rail lines face severe declines in passenger numbers. JR Hokkaido, where railway 
management has been particularly difficult, announced in November 2016 that about 1200 
km of lines cannot be sustained only through the revenues from the businesses and the 
interest of the Management Stabilization Funds. When it comes to upholding unprofitable 
public transport, Sweden implemented a radical reform in 1988 by means of vertical 
separation and decentralisation and then gradually introduced competitive tendering to 
procure unprofitable passenger rail services. In order to tackle current challenges in the 
Japanese railway sector, it could be beneficial to draw lessons from the experience in 
Sweden. As the railways provide several different benefits to the society, it seems rational 
that those beneficiaries provide certain finances accordingly to sustain the unprofitable 
railway operations. Also, in order to introduce a system to provide the subsidy, it seems 
necessary to make each account of the railway company transparent. 
1. Background to the Study and Aim of Research 
In April 1987, the Japanese National Railways (JNR) underwent a major reform. JNR was 
divided into six vertically integrated companies, and a single vertically separated freight 
railway company. This case is considered to be a successful reform of a public enterprise in 
Japan as transport volume and productivity of railways have increased largely. However, 
mainly because of the recent population decrease in some parts of Japan, many local rail 
lines now face severe declines in passenger numbers. For JR Hokkaido, where the average 
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passenger traffic density is lower than other JR companies, the management has been 
particularly difficult. In November 2016 it announced that 1237 km of lines cannot be 
sustained only through the revenues from the businesses and the interest of the 
Management Stabilization Funds. Consequently, it has become necessary to take certain 
measures if these unprofitable lines should be kept in the future.  
As the above status shows, despite the overall success of the 1987 JNR reform, the current 
railway management in Japan requires some measures in order to uphold operation of local 
lines. In comparison, in Sweden, both the national government and regional governments 
allocate finances to the railway sector, and the passenger railway services have been 
operated where population density is much less than that in Japan. Thus, based on a study 
about the financial schemes to allocate public spending on unprofitable railways in Sweden, 
the paper seeks to address the key issues necessary to allocate public finances for 
sustaining unprofitable rail lines in Japan. 
2. Research Design and Outline of Paper 
The paper is structured as follows, reflecting the design of the research. The next section 
studies and investigates the current status of unprofitable passenger railways in Japan. As 
the status vary depending on the size of the passenger railways, this study focuses on JR 
Hokkaido that has a large network and requires public financial support for continuing its 
unprofitable railway lines. Section 4 then explores the operation and management of 
passenger railways in Sweden, in order to find some implications for solving the current 
financial issues that Japanese railways are now facing. The study is based upon not only 
already available papers but also interviews with representatives from affected entities in 
Sweden such as the Ministry of Enterprise and Innovation, the national operator SJ AB, and 
the County Public Transport Authorities (CPTAs) in the counties of Stockholm, Uppsala and 
Jönköping. Section 5 compares the financial schemes to operate passenger railways in 
Japan and Sweden in order to draw some conclusions on how to sustain unprofitable lines. 
Section 6 then discusses some key issues related to the allocation of public finances to the 
railway sector in Japan based on the lessons gained through this study. Finally, Section 7 
concludes the study by summarizing the implications gained. 
3. Railway Reform and Current Status of Japanese Railways 
Owing to lack of competitiveness against other modes of transport and failure of the 
management of JNR, JNR lost transport market share for many years. JNR ran a deficit in 
1964, and the annual deficit continued for the latter subsequent years. JNR accumulated 
long-term debt each year, and at the time of the JNR reform in 1987 it amounted to 25 trillion 
yen (Aoki, et al., 2000, p.183). 
Besides financial difficulties, JNR also faced severe criticism of its ineffective management. 
Then, prior to other countries, the JNR reform was finally implemented in April 1987. Through 
the reform, JNR was divided into six vertically integrated regional passenger companies, and 
a single vertically separated nation-wide freight company, JR Freight (Figure 1). 
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Figure 1 JNR Reform in 1987 
For the three passenger railway companies (JR East, JR Central and JR West) on the main 
island of Honshu, which has metropolitan areas and several large cities, the rail business has 
been profitable, even though they bear the cost of infrastructure and the burden of the 
allocated JNR liabilities. In contrast, the other three passenger railway companies (JR 
Hokkaido, JR Shikoku and JR Kyushu) provide their rail services on Japan’s smaller islands, 
and it was predicted that the operations of these companies would become unprofitable. 
Thus, the government allocated Management Stabilization Funds (MSF) to these companies 
at the time of the JNR reform. 
4. Railway Operation in Sweden 
4.1 Railway Reform in Sweden 
Sweden was the first country in Europe to introduce vertical separation into state-owned 
railways. Until 1988 the Swedish State Railways (SJ) was a state-owned business 
administration with a monopoly position upheld partly by means of laws and regulations. The 
majority of passenger services were unprofitable but were considered important to keep for 
socio-economic and political reasons. The railway network was under-capitalised and 
infrastructure reinvestments typically came to a halt once a line started to make losses. This 
kind of vicious circle made the conditions worse. State-subsidies covering the operating 
deficits of loss-making lines had been introduced already in 1958. Even though these 
subsidies increased in the following decades, several lines were closed and the financial 
situation of SJ deteriorated further during the 1970s and 1980s. It was also difficult for the 
state to grant more money to SJ, partly because it could be regarded as unfair from the 
viewpoint of other transportation firms, and partly because it was difficult to monitor how the 
money was spent inside the large conglomerate that SJ constituted at the time 
(Alexandersson and Hultén, 2005).  
JR Hokkaido 
JR East 
JR Central 
JR Shikoku 
JR West 
JR Kyushu 
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Following a severe crisis in 1986, it was decided to restructure the industry drastically. The 
outcome was the 1988 Transport Policy Act. The major element of the Act was to introduce 
vertical separation of infrastructure from train operations, with an aim to make the conditions 
for rail more equal to those for road. Following the aims of the Act, Banverket (BV) was set 
up as a national rail infrastructure authority in 1988, and the state thereby started to take full 
responsibility for track infrastructure investments and maintenance.  
Another essential element of the 1988 Transport Policy Act was a decentralisation 
(regionalisation) of responsibility for the unprofitable local and regional lines. For local and 
regional public transport in Sweden, the Transport Policy Act of 1979 had created the County 
Public Transport Authorities (CPTAs) as a new institutional structure for regional public 
transportation. The 1988 Transport Policy Act extended the responsibility of the CPTAs into 
the unprofitable regional railway services. Then, in return for continuing the services (which 
was not obligatory)1, a temporary state subsidy was provided, covering the annual operating 
deficits, and the relevant rolling stock was also transferred to the CPTAs (Alexandersson, 
2015). 
The reformed SJ was to concentrate on becoming a profitable (still state-owned) train 
operator. During the 1990s other lines of business were divested, such as bus operations, 
forwarding services and hotels. In 2001 a new reform split SJ’s remaining divisions into 
separate companies. Thus, SJ today is only a passenger rail company, while freight services, 
railway real estate, and vehicle maintenance are to be found in the companies Green Cargo, 
Jernhusen and Euromaint, respectively.  
4.2 Financing of Railways 
As noted above, the 1988 Transport Policy Act largely changed the means to subsidize the 
railway sector. This section outlines how the government and CPTAs provide their finances 
to the railway sector in Sweden. 
Since the introduction of vertical separation in 1988, the government took the responsibility of 
the management of infrastructure through its authority, BV (today Trafikverket, TrV). This 
reform improved the transparency of the usage of the state grant since it was channeled to a 
national authority rather than to a specific operator. As one could now be certain that the 
subsidy went directly to the infrastructure, it became much more difficult to argue that state 
grants form a source of unfair competition and favour SJ. Accordingly, the government and 
Parliament started to support the railway sector actively by means of increased spending on 
infrastructure, and now spend 2 to 3 times more in real terms on railway infrastructure than in 
the late 1980s (Alexandersson, 2015) – see Figure 1. 
1 The CPTAs could choose to uphold the services by rail or replacing them with bus services.
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A portion of the money spent on rail infrastructure comes from the track access charges that 
train operators pay to TrV. In 1989, when these charges were first introduced, they amounted 
to about 1.2 billion SEK (in 2014 prices). In 1999 they were reduced and roughly amounted 
to 0.5 billion annually for the period 2000-2008. Since 2009 these charges have increased 
step-wise, again reaching 1.2 billion SEK in 2014 and 1.6 billion SEK in 2016 (Trafikverket, 
2017). The increase is a combined effect of actual changes in fees and an increased supply 
of railway services. The charges are not yet covering the direct costs of infrastructure and 
are still low by international standards. Thus, to invest and maintain the railway infrastructure, 
the government allocates public funds raised from outside of the railway sector. 
As noted in the section above, CPTAs started to finance the railway sector to operate non-
profitable regional railway services once the 1988 Transport Policy Act had been enacted. 
These services have been procured by competitive tendering since 1990. According to 
interviews with representatives from three CPTAs in the counties of Stockholm, Uppsala, and 
Jönköping, each CPTA established a standard that about 50 % of the costs would be 
covered by the passenger revenues and the rest would be covered by public subsidies, 
raised from the taxpayers in each county. This corresponds well to overall national figures, 
where ticket revenues amounted to a total of 4.4 billion SEK in 2016, while total traffic costs 
amounted to 8.5 billion SEK (Trafikanalys, 2017), equalling a 48 % subsidisation. 
For the non-profitable inter-regional railway passenger transport, SJ held a monopoly and 
received subsidies. The government started to procure these services through competitive 
tendering in 1993. Different government authorities have had this task over the years; today 
the responsibility lies at TrV. The amount of money spent by the state on passenger train 
services has decreased a lot since 1989, reflecting the changed focus of the state to support 
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Figure 1. Development of expenditure on railway infrastructure in Sweden 1989-2014 
Source: SOU (2015:42)  
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infrastructure rather than train operations and the corresponding increased spending of the 
CPTAs. 
Due to the structural changes and the many different financing sources, it is very difficult to 
calculate the overall development of total public subsidies directed to the Swedish railway 
sector. However, it is safe to say that, especially when infrastructure spending is taken into 
account, there has been a very substantial increase in the level of subsidisation. 
The company SJ has been profitable since 2004, reporting an operating profit of 837 million 
SEK in 2016, and pays taxes as well as dividends to the state. It has also been able to meet 
its owner’s financial target of a minimum return on operating capital of 7 percent in four out of 
the latest five years (SJ AB, 2017). 
5. Comparison Between Japan and Sweden 
- With a Focus on the Case of JR Hokkaido -
As has been shown in the sections above, railway reform in Japan was implemented by a 
model largely different from the one in Sweden. As long as the revenue to the railway 
company covers its costs, although urban trains on some lines are very crowded and the 
number of trains is limited in rural areas, so far these Japanese railways have not faced 
serious problems regarding their management. Instead, these profitable companies, such as 
JR East, JR Central and JR West, not only improved the transport services but also 
improved the revenue from the affiliated businesses. For example, the revenue of the JR 
East Group was 1,955 billion JPY in FY 1989, and it had increased to 2,881 billion JPY in 
2016. While the business scope was limited to railway transport and the necessary 
subsidiary businesses during the JNR’s era, the revenue from the affiliated business of the 
JR East Group has increased to 32% (JR East, 2017) 
The status of the railway companies which operate unprofitable railway networks is largely 
different. As for JR Hokkaido, among 1237 km of lines that the company announced that they 
cannot be sustained only through the revenues and the interest of the MSF, 3 lines covering 
179.4 km transport less than 200 persons in average passenger transport density. JR 
Hokkaido wishes to change the transport mode of these lines to bus services. And, it has 8 
lines covering 926 km with the passenger transport density between 200 and 2000 persons, 
and the company wishes to start negotiation with local governments about the future 
direction of the lines (JR Hokkaido, 2017). 
Because of the above-noted conditions, annual financial results of JR Hokkaido are negative, 
and the outline of the P/L statement in FY2016 of JR Hokkaido is shown in Table 1. 
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            Table 1 The Outline of the P/L Statement of JR Hokkaido in FY2016 
Unit: billion JPY 
Account Amount
Railway transport 
       Operating income  
       Operating expenses 
-53.4
  83.2 
136.6
Affiliated businesses 
       Operating income  
       Operating expenses 
3.6
   6.2 
   2.6
Operating Profit  -49.8
Non-operating profit and loss 
        Profit from MSF 
        Other Income
30.9
23.6 
                         7.3 
Ordinary Profit -18.9
             Source: JR Hokkaido (2017) 
At the time of the JNR Reform in 1987, it was planned that annual interest from MSF would 
cover the operating loss, but the amount of the interests has become lower than the 
expectation because of the low-interest rate in Japanese economy. Thus, it covers only 
about 47 % of the operating loss in FY2016. Partly because of this, the ordinary profit of JR 
Hokkaido has been negative these years. 
Because of this negative cash flow, it has been difficult for JR Hokkaido to invest for the 
improvement of the services, and the president, Mr. Shimada, recently said that “If we do 
nothing (to improve financial conditions) our company would be unable to secure funds for 
safety measures at the end of fiscal 2019” (Japan Times, 2016). 
As his comment shows, the current management of JR Hokkaido is facing extremely serious 
financial conditions under the current Japanese railway policy. The operating income of the 
railway transport covers only 61 % of its operating costs. However, if the railways were 
operated under the similar scheme as that in Sweden, where the government covers 
infrastructure expenses and CPTA covers almost 50 % of the operating costs of regional rail 
transport, the possibilities to manage the conditions currently facing JR Hokkaido could be 
improved to a large extent.  
6. Current Schemes to Sustain Unprofitable Railways in Japan 
This section provides an overview of recent legal efforts that have been taken to sustain 
unprofitable railways in Japan. 
6.1 Act on Revitalization and Rehabilitation of Local Public Transport Systems 
In Japan the number of unprofitable railways has increased in recent years. To manage the 
financial difficulties of those unprofitable passenger railway services and other public 
transport, the government has enacted or revised Acts regarding public transport as follows: 
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October 2007:  The “Act on Revitalization and Rehabilitation of Local Public Transport 
Systems” was enacted. This made it possible to support unprofitable public 
transport by regional governments. 
October 2008:   The Act mentioned above was revised. This revision made it possible to  
support unprofitable passenger railways through vertical separation. 
May 2014:         The Act mentioned above and the “Act on Special Measures Concerning 
Urban Renaissance” were revised. The revision means that the policies for 
transport and urban planning have been integrated to establish better and 
sustainable public transport and urban systems.  
As a background to the establishment of these Acts, several issues, such as urban sprawl, 
motorization, a decrease of the passengers of public transport, and management difficulties 
in public transport companies, have been worsening the situation in a vicious circle, a bit 
similar to what took place decades earlier in Sweden. Thus, integrated measures are 
required to solve these issues, and the Japanese government has an aim to establish 
compact cities by integrating both transport and urban policies (Figure 2). 
Figure 2. Integration of transport and urban policies to establish compact cities 
Source: MLIT (2015) 
When a regional government utilizes the “Act on Revitalization and Rehabilitation of Local 
Public Transport Systems” to sustain unprofitable railways, the regional government will 
generally transfer the infrastructure from a railway company and become the new owner. 
Thus, the railway will be vertically separated. Since vertical separation is introduced, the 
regional government will pay the cost of the infrastructure, both for investment and 
maintenance. When the proposed plan is admitted based on the Act, the national 
government provides a third of the investment to upgrade/replace the railway facilities but 
does not pay subsidy to cover a part of annual expenses.  
Desired  
Direction
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6.2 Regulation to Sustain Conventional Intercity Lines Separated from JR 
Passenger Companies
While the above-mentioned Act is mainly for sustaining local railways for regional 
governments, there is a regulation to sustain intercity railways where the lines are separated 
from JR passenger companies and JR Freight has access. 
In Japan, Shinkansen infrastructure has been constructed as public works since the reform 
of JNR. Since operation of new Shinkansen lines should not deteriorate the JR Passenger 
Companies’ financial results, the agreement of local communities is required with respect to 
the management separation from the JR Passenger Company of conventional lines parallel 
to new Shinkansen line segments (JR East, 2004). Thus, the sections of conventional lines 
parallel to new Shinkansen line segments have been transferred to local governments. 
However, since express trains would not be operated on these conventional lines, the 
number of trains would be much fewer than before. As a result, it has become more difficult 
to sustain these lines only by means of the revenue from local passenger trains and access 
charges paid by JR Freight. Regarding JR Freight’s access charges, the amount is stipulated 
as avoidable costs, and it is designed so that the rest of the necessary infrastructure costs 
should be covered by the passenger companies.  
Because of the outline mentioned above, the passenger sector’s financial bearing for rail 
infrastructure has been relatively large, and local governments started to bear large amounts 
of financial bearing, once the management of this section was separated from JR Passenger 
Companies. In 2002, in order to mitigate the local governments’ financial bearing, a 
stipulation was established with the implication that JRTT, a public entity, provides the 
payment that makes it possible to sustain the separated conventional lines.  
Although this stipulation is effective only for the separated conventional lines parallel to new 
Shinkansen line segments, it is worth noting this case as a measure to sustain certain part of 
conventional inter-city lines in Japan. 
7. Discussion  
- Lessons and Implication for Sustaining Unprofitable Passenger Rail Services in 
Japan - 
Passenger local railways in Japan have been facing tough conditions in recent years due to 
severe competition from cars and the challenges stemming from of a decreasing population. 
Also, several railways seem to be at risk getting stuck in a vicious circle. However, as the 
railway sector in Sweden has been successfully reformed and revitalized since 1988, it 
seems necessary to establish certain schemes to sustain unprofitable passenger railways in 
Japan as well. This necessity is not only for JR Hokkaido but also for other passenger 
railway companies, since most of the unprofitable railway passenger services have so far 
been sustained by cross-subsidisation. There is a high risk that excess cross-subsidisation 
damages the market share of rail, since it utilizes the profits on certain parts of the rail 
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network, and inter-modal competition could make it increasingly difficult to earn profits on 
those parts of the network (Nash, 2007). 
This section discusses several key issues to prepare the ground for the introduction of public 
subsidies in the Japanese railway sector and to uphold a stable management of the railways 
based on the present market conditions in Japan. 
1) Coordination with other modes of transport 
In 1996, the government of Japan devised a plan to abolish supply-demand adjustment 
regulations in principle (MLIT, 1999). Based on this decision, transport services have been 
deregulated already. Thus, in general, the local governments do not interfere with the 
transportation market. On the other hand, they make a plan of public transport service 
network when they seek subsidies based on the Act on Revitalization and Rehabilitation of 
Local Public Transport Systems, which was enacted in October 2007.  
When the local governments try to develop public transport especially under unprofitable 
market conditions, it is essential to coordinate among different modes of transport. In this 
stage, it is essential to attain equal footing among them regarding the bearing of 
infrastructure costs of each mode and the external costs caused by the operation of 
transport services.  
2) Coordination with urban planning 
Transport planning and urban planning should be closely coordinated. In Japan, the “Act 
on Revitalization and Rehabilitation of Local Public Transport Systems” and the “Act on 
Special Measures Concerning Urban Renaissance” were revised in May 2014. These 
policies also aim to integrate transport planning and regional planning. Since the two 
issues are closely related, the policies will be effective when they are closely coordinated. 
3) Improvement of transparency of the expenses 
In the case of Sweden, the government has been responsible for the national railway 
network since the reform in 1988, and CPTAs have been responsible for regional transport. 
In this case, vertical separation has worked as an effective way to make the both 
infrastructure and operation accounts clear and transparent.  
When the concerned entities, such as national government and regional governments, try 
to provide subsidies to the railway sector, transparency of the expenses must be secured. 
It seems practically difficult for them to provide subsidies without clear financial statements 
of each division where they take financial responsibilities. As the Swedish case shows, 
vertical separation is effective for this aim not only for infrastructure but also for operating 
divisions as they pay infrastructure charges and this can make the cost of the divisions 
clear and transparent. 
4) Financial bearing based on the benefit 
There are various kinds of unprofitable passenger railways in Japan. Some lines are 
utilized mainly for regional passenger transport, and other lines are also utilized for 
intercity transport of both passenger and freight. The benefits of the lines vary depending 
on the type of lines. For example, the former regional lines deliver benefits mainly within a 
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certain region. On the other hand, the latter intercity lines deliver benefits outside of the 
segment of the lines since people and goods can be transported long distances. Provided 
that people who receive benefits should bear the cost of the lines, the way for bearing the 
costs should also be varied. It seems reasonable that people in a wider area should bear 
the cost of the intercity lines since people outside of the concerned segment of the line 
also receive benefits from the line. 
The discussion to sustain the railway network in Hokkaido is in progress at present, and it 
is argued that the necessity of a line should be judged not by the profitability under the 
current status. On the other hand, as the local governments think that it is difficult to 
provide sufficient subsidies, the concerned people reached the consensus that it would be 
practically difficult to sustain the entire network in the future (Hokkaido, 2017). 
As section 6 showed, the “Act on Revitalization and Rehabilitation of Local Public 
Transport Systems” proposes to introduce vertical separation provided that the regional 
governments wish to sustain the segment in question. But, as some segments, especially 
intercity lines, deliver benefits to wider areas, is seems reasonable that people outside of 
the segments would bear financial costs for them. For example, regarding the segments 
that freight trains are operating, even people in the Tokyo metropolitan area receive a 
certain benefit. Thus, there might be the case that the similar policies discussed in Section 
6.2 can be introduced to sustain such intercity lines. 
When it comes to the segments that many sightseers travel, Hokkaido receives a benefit 
since the concerned line contributes to improve the attractiveness of Hokkaido and 
increases the number of passengers. Thus, along with regional governments, there seems 
to be a reason for Hokkaido to play an important role in sustaining these lines. 
As such, since Japan has various kinds of railway lines in the country, it seems difficult for 
the government to provide financial support to sustain the entire railway network. Thus, it 
has become necessary to consider who receive the benefits of the segment of the line and 
to introduce measures making they bear a financial responsibility to sustain the segment. 
5) Retaining technical abilities to retain infrastructure effectively 
Japan already has several cases where regional governments took over the ownership of 
infrastructure to sustain unprofitable railway lines, based on the “Act on Revitalization and 
Rehabilitation of Local Public Transport Systems”. In these cases, in contrast to vertical 
separation in European countries, the railway company not only operates the trains but 
also manages the infrastructure as part of its daily operation processes.  
Nevertheless, since the regional governments retain the ownership of the infrastructure, 
they take the responsibility as an infrastructure owner. Also, although daily maintenance 
works are carried out by a railway company, they have to promote engineering works to 
upgrade and replace the infrastructure. Thus, as infrastructure owners, the regional 
governments also require sufficient engineering capabilities to take appropriate measures 
in certain stages. Otherwise, they would simply follow what the contractor insists on doing, 
and the contract would tend to be expensive. However, compared with engineers in a 
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railway company, it is not easy for regional governments to acquire engineering 
capabilities since their staff would work on various tasks as civil servants. 
The required engineering skills largely differ depending on the type of railways. For 
example, in order to maintain and manage the infrastructure, the electrified lines on which 
express intercity trains and freight trains run require more sophisticated engineering 
capabilities than non-electrified lines where only regional trains run. Thus, it is essential 
that a certain entity with professional engineering capabilities retains the former type of 
infrastructure. It is worth noting that European railway infrastructure managers are large-
scale entities with a number of well-trained engineers. 
8.  Conclusions 
This study has explored the Swedish railway reform of 1988 and current railway operations, 
trying to draw lessons in order to establish certain schemes for sustaining unprofitable 
passenger railways in Japan. Despite support from the MSF, section 5 showed that the 
interest beared by MSF covers only 17 % of the operating expenses of railway transport in 
JR Hokkaido. Thus, it appears that the passenger railway services in Hokkaido receive fewer 
subsidies than corresponding services in Sweden, where the government takes responsibility 
of infrastructure and CPTAs cover almost 50 per cent of the operating costs of regional 
railways. 
Despite this and the severe management difficulties of many Japanese local railways, 
including JR Hokkaido, it is neither rational nor practical to reform all the Japanese railways 
in accordance to the Swedish railway reform model. This is because other profitable 
integrated railways keep independent management without receiving subsidy. Also, there are 
many private railways in Japan, and many of them have succeeded in internalizing the 
external economy of passenger railway operation. Thus, it does not seem reasonable to 
reform these profitable integrated railways to a large extent. 
On the other hand, it is also apparent that the railway sector in Japan should establish a 
more clear and robust scheme to sustain unprofitable passenger railway operations, since 
such operations are likely to become more common in the future. Otherwise, the future 
outcome might be one of the following: 1) some lines would not be possible to sustain even 
though they are beneficial from the viewpoint of Japanese economy; 2) some profitable lines 
would lose competitiveness to other transport modes because of excess cross-subsidisation. 
As noted above, the railway sector in Japan retains both operations that can keep the current 
status and those that should be changed. Thus, based on careful examination of the sector 
both in Japan and abroad, it is necessary to consider rational and practical options to 
develop the current schemes to sustain unprofitable railway lines in Japan. This study has 
tried to highlight some of the key issues based on a study of the railway sector in Sweden, 
but there could certainly be other interesting cases to examine as well.  
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